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2017, Las Vegas massacre, dubbed the “deadliest mass shooting in modern 
U.S. history,” has brought newfound urgency and attention to lone wolf 
violence and terrorism. Although a topic of pressing concern, the 
phenomenon—which centers on mass violence inflicted by one individual—
is underexamined and undertheorized within legal literature. This scholarly 
neglect facilitates flat understandings of the phenomenon and enables the 
racial and religious double standards arising from law enforcement 
investigations and prosecutions of white and Muslim lone wolves. 
This Essay contributes a timely reconceptualization of the 
phenomenon, coupled with a typology adopted from social science, for 
understanding the myriad forms of lone wolf terrorism. In addition to 
contributing the theoretical frameworks to further examine lone wolf 
terrorism within legal scholarship, this Essay examines how the assignment 
of the lone wolf designation by law enforcement functions as: (1) a 
presumptive exemption from terrorism for white culprits and (2) a 
presumptive connection to terrorism for Muslim culprits. This asymmetry is 
rooted in the distinct racialization of white and Muslim identity, and it is 
driven by War on Terror baselines that profile Muslim identity as 
presumptive of a terror threat. 
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[A]t this point, we believe it is a local individual [not a terrorist], he 
resides here locally. 
—Clark County Sherriff Joseph Lombardo‡ 
 
As far as we can tell right now, this is certainly an example of the kind 
of homegrown extremism that all of us have been so concerned about for 
a very long time. 
—President Barack Obama†† 
INTRODUCTION: A TALE OF TWO LONE WOLVES 
A. Las Vegas Shooting—October 1, 2017 
Stephen Paddock peered onto the concert hall across the boulevard from 
the thirty-second floor of the Mandalay Bay Hotel.1 The illuminated Las 
 
 ‡ Tom Batchelor, Nevada State Law Defines Law Vegas Mass Shooting as an Act of Terrorism, 
INDEPENDENT (Oct. 2, 2017, 10:27 AM), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/las-vegas-
shooting-nevada-terrorism-state-law-act-police-stephen-paddock-a7978456.html 
[https://perma.cc/X3PH-TGMC] (characterizing Stephen Paddock, the culprit of the Las Vegas shooting). 
 †† Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Obama Says Orlando Gunman Was Probably a Homegrown Extremist, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/us/politics/obama-orlando-shooter-
isis.html [https://perma.cc/6MLL-PKPD] (characterizing Omar Mateen, the culprit of the Orlando 
nightclub shooting). 
 1 Jose A. Delreal & Jonah Engel Bromwich, Stephen Paddock, Las Vegas Suspect, Was a Gambler 
Who Drew Little Attention, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/02/us/stephen-
paddock-vegas-shooter.html [https://perma.cc/R2DX-V5FT]. 
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Vegas Strip was a familiar sight for the sixty-four-year-old, who for years 
walked on the very grounds he looked down upon minutes after 10:00 PM 
that Sunday evening, October 1, 2017.2 Thousands of people gathered for the 
country music festival across Las Vegas Boulevard, celebrating a musical 
genre that Paddock counted among his favorites.3 One can imagine the scene: 
inches from the suite’s panorama window, Paddock’s stare was fixed and his 
stance frozen, high atop the city where he satisfied his zeal for gambling 
huge sums of money within the Strip’s familiar string of hotels.4 
However, that evening, Paddock would aim to gratify a different kind 
of zeal. He stood feet away from his stockpile of twenty-three guns,5 which 
he stealthily transported into his suite. Minutes later, he used those guns to 
kill fifty-eight people and injure over 500 more attending the Route 91 
Harvest festival concert.6 Paddock opened fire on the crowd of 22,000 at 
10:05 PM and continued shooting for the next ten minutes—a time span that 
probably seemed like an eternity for those below.7 
The shooting was ultimately dubbed “the deadliest mass shooting in 
modern U.S. history” by a number of media outlets.8 Consequently, the City 
of Las Vegas and Paddock’s name will forever be associated with one of the 
darkest moments in America’s recent memory. However, hours after the 
attack, before an investigation commenced, the Clark County Sherriff 
disassociated Paddock from terrorism by calling him a “lone wolf,” and the 
media firestorm covering the tragedy followed suit.9 
 
 2 Id. 
 3 Amy O’Neill and Bob Ortega, The Unknowable Stephen Paddock and the Ultimate Mystery: Why?, 
CNN (Oct. 7, 2017, 9:40 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/06/us/unknowable-stephen-paddock-and-
the-mystery-motive/index.html [https://perma.cc/JP26-YGU4]. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Barbara Liston et al., Las Vegas Gunman Stephen Paddock Was a High-Stakes Gambler Who ‘Kept 
to Himself’ Before Massacre, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2017/10/02/las-vegas-gunman-liked-to-gamble-listened-to-country-music-lived-quiet-retired-
life-before-massacre [https://perma.cc/DG4Y-8VSR]. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Matt Pearce, David Montero & Richard Winton, Las Vegas Gunman Shot Security Guard a Full 
Six Minutes Before Opening Fire on Concertgoers, Police Reveal, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2017, 6:10 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-vegas-shooting-20171009-story.html [https://perma.cc/AB4Q-
B8KD].  
 8 See, e.g., Bill Chappell & Doreen McCallister, Las Vegas Shooting Update: At Least 59 People Are 
Dead After Gunman Attacks Concert, NPR (Oct. 2, 2017, 3:15 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/
thetwo-way/2017/10/02/554976369/section-of-las-vegas-strip-is-closed-after-music-festival-shooting 
[https://perma.cc/5MZA-KEJZ]. 
 9 Delreal & Bromwich, supra note 1. 
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B. The Orlando Nightclub Shooting—June 12, 2016 
Before the Las Vegas massacre, the horrific shooting in Orlando on 
June 12, 2016, held the designation of the “deadliest mass shooting” in U.S. 
history.10 Shortly after midnight that Sunday morning, Omar Mateen opened 
fire inside Pulse Nightclub, a nightlife hub and “safe space” for the 
metropolitan Orlando area’s diverse LGBTQ communities.11 He killed forty-
nine people and injured fifty more12 during a night when 90% of the club-
goers were Latino.13 
Like Paddock, Mateen, a “deeply disturbed”14 twenty-nine-year-old 
American of Afghan heritage,15 took his own life shortly after opening fire. 
But unlike Paddock, Mateen was Afghan and Muslim, identities that are 
routinely conflated with—and inextricably tied to—terrorism.16 Because of 
his faith and ethnicity, Mateen fit within the embedded profile of the terrorist, 
and he was “raced” as such17—acting in a purely individual capacity would 
not change that racial and religious equation. Law enforcement and many 
voices within mainstream media labeled him a “lone wolf,” but the 
“radicalized” variety: connected—not exempted—from terrorism.18 
However, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was well 
acquainted with Mateen and previously cleared him from terror affiliation or 
involvement on two occasions. FBI agents interviewed Mateen three times 
during 2013 and 2014, delving deep into his personal life and assigning an 
 
 10 Maia Davis, Orlando Nightclub Mass Shooting Is Deadliest in US History, ABC NEWS (June 12, 
2016, 4:06 PM), abcnews.go.com/US/orlando-nightclub-mass-shooting-deadliest-us-history/story?id=
39797486 [https://perma.cc/3VYW-U6TH] (“The 50 deaths, so far, are 18 more than . . . the second most-
fatal massacre . . . according to data from Mother Jones that goes back to 1982.”). 
 11 Daniel D’Addario, Orlando Shooting: The Gay Bar as Safe Space Has Been Shattered, TIME (June 
12, 2016, 4:04 PM), http://time.com/4365403/orlando-shooting-gay-bar-pulse-nightclub/ 
[https://perma.cc/SX7S-Z5SX]. 
 12 Hirschfeld Davis, supra note ††. 
 13 Steven W. Thrasher, Latino Community Mourns Pulse Shooting Victims: “90% Were Hispanic”, 
GUARDIAN (June 14, 2016, 1:36 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jun/14/latino-
hispanic-orlando-shooting-victims [https://perma.cc/Q54J-DVP5]. 
 14 See Mark Mazzetti et al., Omar Mateen, Twice Scrutinized by F.B.I., Shows Threat of Lone 
Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/us/politics/orlando-
shooting-omar-mateen.html [https://perma.cc/AGN3-44E3]. 
 15 Orlando Gay Nightclub Shooting: Who Was Omar Mateen?, BBC (June 14, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-36513468 [https://perma.cc/5S49-JRT9]. 
 16 See Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1586 (2002) (stating that 
“[v]ery few persons who appear ‘Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim’ are terrorists,” however, “[m]any 
men who fall into this category, including law professors, have been subjected to questioning”). 
 17 See Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the “Racing” 
of Arab Americans as “Terrorists,” 8 ASIAN L.J. 1, 12 (2001). 
 18 David K. Li, FBI Chief: Orlando Gunman Was Self-Radicalized Lone Wolf, N.Y. POST (June 13, 
2016, 1:00 PM), https://nypost.com/2016/06/13/fbi-chief-orlando-gunman-had-strong-indications-of-
radicalization [https://perma.cc/5Z77-WVHP]. 
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undercover agent to make contact.19 Ultimately, the FBI closed Mateen’s 
case, finding that his “connections to terrorism were . . . insubstantial.”20 
Despite these conclusions, and the lack of material evidence tying 
Mateen’s murders to a transnational terror network or terrorist ideology,21 
law enforcement and mainstream media outlets swiftly turned to the 
presumption and narrative of terrorism.22 In a span of hours, law enforcement 
had branded Mateen a terrorist before an investigation into his motives and 
ties even commenced. 
C. Two Lone Wolves, but Only One Terrorist 
Two lone wolves, with no established or substantial ties to transnational 
terror networks, were at the center of the tragic tales of the Las Vegas 
massacre and the Orlando nightclub shooting. These two incidents, which 
rank among the deadliest mass shootings in contemporary American history, 
illustrate how terrorism is instantly presumed when the lone wolf killer is 
Muslim, and the prospect of terrorism is typically dismissed when the actor 
is white (and non-Muslim). Race and religion stand at the center of any tale 
involving a lone wolf. More often than not, race and religion are the most 
salient factors in determining whether law enforcement will conduct a 
terrorism investigation and prosecution. 
The recent list of shootings and mass killing involving white non-
Muslim and Muslim culprits has revealed a pattern in which the former are 
generally designated lone wolf killers, and the latter are presumptive lone 
wolf terrorists—a critical distinction whereby killers are prosecuted 
criminally outside of the counterterror process,23 while terrorists are 
prosecuted on both grounds. While discursive understandings of lone wolf 
conceive of the concept exclusively as an exemption from terrorism applied 
to white culprits,24 the designation can be tied to terrorism, conventional 
criminal investigations and charges, or both. This Essay argues that these 
 
 19 Mazzetti et al., supra note 14. 
 20 Spencer Ackerman, Orlando Gunman Known to FBI Shows Difficulty of “Lone Wolf” Cases, 
GUARDIAN (June 12, 2016, 6:22 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jun/12/florida-
gunman-omar-mateen-fbi-lone-wolf [https://perma.cc/7B4U-FPDD]. 
 21 Id.  
 22 Mazzetti et al., supra note 14. 
 23 JEFFREY CONNOR & CAROL ROLLIE FLYNN, REPORT: LONE WOLF TERRORISM, GEORGETOWN 
UNIV. SEC. STUDIES PROGRAM: NAT’L SEC. CRITICAL ISSUE TASK FORCE 9 (2015) (“Absent political 
motivation, an attack would more closely resemble traditional forms of crime, organized violence, or hate 
crimes.”). 
 24 See, e.g., Chuck Hobbs, “Lone Wolf” Characterization of Mass Murders Is the Epitome of White 
Privilege, HILL (Oct. 3, 2017, 12:40 PM), http://thehill.com/opinion/criminal-justice/353627-lone-wolf-
characterization-of-murderers-is-the-epitome-of-white [https://perma.cc/3VGU-Y6SG]. 
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investigations and charges often depend on the racial and religious identity 
of the culprit. 
Although both Paddock and Mateen were lone wolves—culprits 
carrying out mass violence in an individual capacity—their distinct racial 
and religious identities altered the legal effect of that designation. 
Furthermore, race and religion steered whether their mass shootings were 
pursued as acts of terror or merely criminal acts. This Essay investigates the 
racial and religious dimensions of the lone wolf designation, beginning with 
a comparative racial analysis of white and Muslim identity, and how deeply 
rooted tropes assigned to both drive criminal and counterterror framing of 
lone wolf culprits. After an examination of the racial roots of this disparate 
framing, this Essay proceeds to examine how the lone wolf designation 
deployed by law enforcement functions as a presumption of terror exemption 
when the culprit is white (and non-Muslim), and as a presumption of terror 
connection when the culprit is Muslim. 
In addition to investigating the racial and religious double standards tied 
to law enforcement, this Essay theorizes the meaning and distinct types of 
lone wolf terrorism. Further, it contributes to legal literature a useful 
typology that highlights lone wolf terrorism’s myriad forms. In addition to 
illustrating that lone wolf terrorism is not a strategic or structural monolith, 
this typology enables critical analysis of the phenomenon beyond the myopic 
racial and religious frames that stifle the discourse. 
While there is robust legal and interdisciplinary literature examining 
modern terrorism, generally fixating on Muslim actors and networks,25 
scarce attention has been specifically paid to lone wolf terrorism,26 a pressing 
area of scholarly and practical concern. By theorizing lone wolf terrorism in 
relation to prevailing counterterror programs, and introducing social science 
frameworks that outline the various types of lone wolf actors, this Essay fills 
this void. In addition, this Essay sheds light on the origins of a double 
standard whereby law enforcement presumptively exempts white culprits 
from terrorism, but connects Muslim culprits to terrorism, as evidenced by 
an analysis of the two deadliest mass shootings in recent history. 
Part I conceptualizes the meaning of lone wolf terrorism and offers a 
theoretical framework that highlights its four distinct types. Part II situates 
 
 25 See, e.g., MARC SAGEMAN, UNDERSTANDING TERROR NETWORKS (2004) (examining terrorism 
and exclusively concerned with Muslim terror networks, although the title and phrase “terror networks” 
is religiously neutral; a highly influential book cited widely within legal scholarship). 
 26 One of the few law review articles that specifically examines lone wolf terrorism conflates the 
phenomenon with Muslims, illustrating the scholarly fixation on Muslim terrorists and, relatedly, the 
failure to theorize lone wolf terrorism as a phenomenon beyond a stereotypical frame. See Kendall Coffey, 
The Lone Wolf—Solo Terrorism and the Challenge of Preventative Prosecution, 7 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 
1 (2011). 
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law enforcement investigation and prosecution of lone wolves within the 
Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) primary counterterror program, 
counter-radicalization policing, that practically frames radicalization as a 
Muslim phenomenon. Part III analyzes the investigative and prosecutorial 
presumptions assigned to lone wolf actors, which regularly impute 
radicalization as the motive if the culprit is Muslim and dismiss the 
possibility if the culprit is white. 
I. THEORIZING LONE WOLF TERRORISM 
Despite becoming an emerging staple of counterterror policing and 
parlance, “lone wolf terrorism” has no consensus definition. This is due in 
part to the competing and conflicting definitions of terrorism, which is 
defined broadly by U.S. law enforcement and the military, and is theorized 
even more broadly by scholars.27 The term’s application drives its 
multivalence, often giving terrorism distinct legal meanings when assigned 
to white, minority, or Muslim actors. Moreover, lone wolf terror attacks are 
a relatively new phenomenon, “increasing from thirty attacks in the 1970s to 
seventy-three in the 2000s, a growth of 143 percent.”28 Therefore, popular 
and political uses of the term have outpaced scholarly framing of lone wolf 
terrorism, and indeed, those uses have preceded formal conceptualization 
that can guide lawmakers and law enforcement. 
Assessing the meaning and types of lone wolf terrorism is the focus of 
this Part. Section A offers several definitions, while Section B outlines a 
typology for understanding lone wolf terrorism, an essential first step before 
examining the presumptive double standards tied to the racial and religious 
identity of the culprit. 
A. Defining “Lone Wolf Terrorism” 
Lone Wolf Terrorism, a 2015 report by the Georgetown University 
Security Studies Program, provides a useful definition and framework for 
understanding the phenomenon.29 It defines lone wolf terrorism as “the 
deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or threat of 
violence committed by a single actor who pursues political change linked to 
a formulated ideology, whether his own or that of a larger organization, and 
who does not receive orders, direction, or material support from outside 
 
 27 See generally Cyrille Begorre-Bret, The Definition of Terrorism and the Challenge of Relativism, 
27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1987 (2006) (providing a theoretical analysis of the series of definitions that U.N. 
member states, including the United States, adopt to prevent and counter terrorism). 
 28 CONNOR & FLYNN, supra note 23, at 10. 
 29 Id. 
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sources.”30 This definition’s mandate of a “formulated ideology” echoes the 
FBI definition of terrorism, which requires violence to be tied to “furtherance 
of political or social objectives.”31 Therefore, this definition does not classify 
an individual culprit inspired to kill without a motive based on a formulated 
(terror) ideology as a lone wolf terrorist, but rather as a lone wolf killer—an 
actor that may be tried and convicted of criminal charges such as conspiracy, 
murder, and related crimes. 
A second definition of lone wolf terrorism focuses centrally on the 
method of operation instead of the ideological motive. Political scientist 
Ramón Spaaij defines lone wolf terrorism as “terrorist attacks carried out by 
persons who (a) operate individually, (b) do not belong to an organized 
terrorist group or network, and (c) whose modi operandi are conceived and 
directed by the individual without any direct outside command or 
hierarchy.”32 Spaaij’s definition echoes many of the conceptual and strategic 
dimensions of the definition offered by the Georgetown Security Studies 
Report, but it lacks the motive component linking the actus reus to a 
“formulated [political] ideology.”33 
This Essay proffers a third definition: lone wolf terrorism is 
premeditated violence unleashed by an individual actor driven by discretely 
held views or a cogent ideology espoused by an organization. A lone wolf 
terrorist may be loosely connected to a (formally designated) terrorist 
organization or hate group or act entirely in a solitary capacity. This 
definition enables identification and, subsequently, prosecution of a lone 
wolf who originates his own ideology entirely untethered to a terror 
organization. This archetype therefore gives primacy to ideology and 
premeditation instead of the connection to a terror network that drives the 
narrative of terrorism as a uniquely Muslim phenomenon. 
Certainly, there is no objective standard for what qualifies as a 
formulated political or social ideology. Assessment of motives is deeply 
politicized and, indeed, colored by the racial and religious identity of the 
culprit. Most definitions of lone wolf terrorism, including that offered by the 
Georgetown Report, are facially neutral. However, the biases of local law 
enforcement, as well as the counterterror priorities and objectives of the 
state, drive distinct and disproportionate application of the term and 
 
 30 Id. at 9. 
 31 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(l) (2011). 
 32 Ramón Spaaij, The Enigma of Lone Wolf Terrorism: An Assessment, 33 STUD. CONFLICT & 
TERRORISM 854, 856 (2010). 
 33 CONNOR & FLYNN, supra note 23, at 9. 
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subsequent investigations of mass killings as acts of terror.34 Neutral 
phrasing of lone wolf terrorism must be accompanied by neutral framing and 
structure, as well as a typology that highlights its myriad types. 
B. A Typology: Lone Wolves of Many Stripes 
Lone wolf terrorism is not strategically or politically monolithic. A 
definition is foundational, but it must be accompanied by a theory of its many 
stripes and forms. This Section provides a useful typology that outlines the 
four principal forms of lone wolf terrorism—(1) lone soldiers; (2) lone 
vanguards; (3) loners; and (4) lone followers—as well as an alternative fifth 
classification: lone wolf killers. 
1. Lone Soldiers 
Lone wolf terrorists may be “lone soldiers” acting alone to further “the 
ideological and political objectives of a larger terrorist organization.”35 Lone 
soldiers are formally enlisted members of a terror organization who fully 
adopt its mandate and accept its formal ideology, but commit a terror attack 
in an individual capacity with the consent or support of that organization. In 
short, lone soldiers may act alone, but they do so as agents of that terror 
network, holding that network vicariously responsible for the attack. 
Mark Stroman, “a lifelong criminal with connections to the Aryan 
Brotherhood,” who shot three South Asian men in Dallas, Texas, in 2001 as 
“revenge for 9/11,”36 meets the definition of the lone soldier lone wolf 
terrorist. He was a member of the Aryan Brotherhood and carried out the 
murders of two of the three men he perceived to be Muslims at the direction 
of the organization with its consent and support.37 Because Stroman 
committed the murders by himself but with the backing of the Brotherhood 
and in furtherance of its white supremacist mission, he is classified as a lone 
wolf of the lone soldier variety. 
This typology presumes Muslim culprits of violence, or “radicals”—
who are geographically isolated from terror networks based in the Arab 
World, and North and Sub-Saharan Africa— to be “lone soldiers” of a group. 
Syed Farook and Tafsheen Malik, the two shooters who killed fourteen 
 
 34 See generally Beau D. Barnes, Confronting the One-Man Wolf Pack: Adapting Law Enforcement 
and Prosecution Responses to the Threat of Lone Wolf Terrorism, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1613 (2012) (offering 
an analysis of lone wolf terrorism within the prevailing American counterterror framework). 
 35 CONNOR & FLYNN, supra note 23, at 29. 
 36 Ben Mathis-Lilley, The Long List of Killings Committed by White Extremists Since the Oklahoma 
City Bombing, SLATE (Aug. 14, 2017, 3:15 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/
2015/06/18/white_extremist_murders_killed_at_least_60_in_u_s_since_1995.html [https://perma.cc/
KLW8-3KE5]. 
 37 Id. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1222 
people inside of the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, California, 
on December 2, 2015,38 are two examples. For Farook and Malik, their 
violence was instantly tied to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) on 
the strength of tenuous evidence,39 and they were presumed to be lone 
followers of the terror network. 
2. Lone Vanguards 
A “lone vanguard” is a lone wolf terrorist that chooses to “act alone to 
advance [an] individual ideology, which makes him or her less likely to 
possess ties to formal terrorist organizations though he or she has the 
requisite social skills to form relationships.”40 Lone vanguards are steered by 
individually crafted ideas that may be inspired by or tied to external 
ideologies but are fundamentally idiosyncratic. Thus, lone vanguards are not 
tied to an external terror organization or ideology, and they instead shape 
their own ideology and function as one-man organizations.41 
Anders Breivik, who carried out two terrorist attacks that resulted in the 
death of ninety-two people in Oslo, Norway, on July 22, 2011,42 is an 
archetypal example of a lone vanguard. Breivik was fueled by a self-authored 
manifesto, 2083: A European Declaration of Independence, that blamed 
Islam and feminism, among other entities, for the decline of Europe.43 While 
loosely inspired by other nativist and white supremacist groups, Breivik 
pioneered his movement and ideology and, on July 22, carried out its vision 
in an individual capacity.44 He was both leader and follower, driven by an 
ideology authored by himself, thus making him a lone vanguard lone wolf. 
 
 38 See Krishnadev Calamur, Marina Koren & Matt Ford, A Day After the San Bernardino Shooting, 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 3, 2015, 3:08 PM), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/12/a-shooter-in-
san-bernardino/418497/ [https://perma.cc/52KB-QPYU]. 
 39 Laura Wagner, Still No Evidence Linking San Bernardino Shooters to ISIS, NPR (Dec. 16, 2015), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/12/16/460021165/still-no-evidence-linking-san-
bernardino-shooters-to-isis-fbi-says [https://perma.cc/X82C-JYBZ]. 
 40 CONNOR & FLYNN, supra note 23, at 30. 
 41 Id. (describing the ideology of the Norwegian lone wolf terrorist, Anders Breivik). 
 42 Peter Beaumont, Norway Attacks: At Least 92 Killed in Oslo and Utøya Island, GUARDIAN (July 
23, 2011, 5:16 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/23/norway-attacks 
[https://perma.cc/XDA8-PFAP]. 
 43 See ANDERS BREIVIK, 2083: A EUROPEAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (2011), 
https://fas.org/programs/tap/_docs/2083_-_A_European_Declaration_of_Independence.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PAD2-VB7F]. 
 44 See generally Magnus Ranstorp, “Lone Wolf Terrorism:” The Case of Anders Breivik, 
31 SECURITY AND PEACE 87 (2013) (examining how Breivik fits the definition of lone wolf terrorism, 
and, implicitly, also the definition of a lone vanguard). 
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3. Loners 
“Loner” lone wolf terrorists are individuals that “act alone to advance 
the goals of their individualized ideology, but their low social competence 
suggests they may also lack the ability to build relationships with peers or 
mobilize others to their cause.”45 Therefore, loners may have a strong desire 
to become part of a terror organization or network, but unlike lone vanguards 
that choose to rebuff these networks, loners are rebuffed by them because of 
their low social competency. They are loners as a matter of circumstance, 
not choice. 
Ted Kaczynski, popularly known as the “Unabomber,” fits the profile 
of the loner lone wolf. A former mathematics professor, Kaczynski wrote a 
manifesto, Industrial Society and Its Future,46 outlining his hatred for 
modern society and his designs to thwart it. Widely regarded as “brilliant” 
for his achievements as a scholar,47 Kaczynski was also known to be an 
introvert and recluse who lacked the personality, charisma, or perhaps desire, 
to enlist and mobilize followers. He acted entirely alone and, from 1978 to 
1995, sent explosives in the mail that took “a leap in sophistication” and 
became more threatening over time.48 Beyond his mode of operation and the 
ideology he crafted, perhaps the most salient fact that highlights Kaczynski’s 
status as a loner was his decision in the 1970s to flee the “industrializing” 
society he so detested for the Montana wilderness,49 which furnished him 
with the isolation he coveted as well as disconnectedness from everyone, 
including a potential following that might have shared his vision. 
4. Lone Followers 
“Lone followers” are lone wolf terrorists that “seize the ideology of an 
existing organization but lack the social competence needed to gain 
acceptance into the group.”50 They may be ideologically tied to a group, but 
they do not possess the social ability to become formal members of that 
group. Lone followers are similar to loners on account of their kindred social 
incompetence, but lone followers seek to be rank-and-file members or 
soldiers of a group instead of leading their own. Unlike loners, lone followers 
 
 45 CONNOR & FLYNN, supra note 23, at 31. 
 46 See TED KACZYNSKI, THE UNABOMBER MANIFESTO: INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY AND ITS FUTURE 
(2008). 
 47 Alston Chase, Harvard and the Making of the Unabomber, ATLANTIC (June 2000), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2000/06/harvard-and-the-making-of-the-unabomber/
378239/ [https://perma.cc/RWV2-E6TU]. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 CONNER & FLYNN, supra note 23, at 31. 
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would prefer to be part of an existing group, though they lack the social skills 
to do so. 
Dylann Roof, who killed nine African-Americans inside the Emanuel 
African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina, on June 
17, 2015, fits the profile of a lone follower. Roof was driven by an ideology 
built upon white supremacy and anti-Black racism, as evidenced by his 
manifesto where he wrote, “Niggers are stupid and violent.”51 Roof’s views 
were shaped by the Council of Conservative Citizens (CCC), a white 
supremacist organization that holds that “God is the author of racism. God is 
the One who divided mankind into different types. . . . Mixing the races is 
rebelliousness against God.”52 Notably, this language echoes Justice Henry 
Brown’s dicta in Plessy v. Ferguson justifying the “separate but equal” 
doctrine.53 
CCC member and spokesman Jared Taylor shared that CCC stood by 
Roof’s ideology but condemned the shooting, noting that “CCC members 
had never heard of Roof and that he never attended a meeting.”54 Roof, who 
a neighbor characterized as “uncomfortably quiet, strangely quiet . . . [and] 
really strange,”55 likely lacked the social competence and skill to become a 
formal or active member of the CCC and, consequently, followed their 
segregationist ideology and mandate from afar as a lone follower. 
The lone follower lone wolf designation is regularly applied to Muslim 
culprits, including the “Boston Bombers,” Tamerlan and Dzhokhar 
Tsarnaev. The brothers Tsarnaev killed three people and injured 264 more 
on April 15, 2013,56 in a premeditated attack on the Boston Marathon.57 
Investigators sought to confirm speculation that the elder brother, Tamerlan, 
was radicalized during a visit to Dagestan, Chechnya, where, his mother said, 
 
 51 Dylann Roof’s Manifesto, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2016), https://assets.documentcloud.org/
documents/3237779/Dylann-Roof-manifesto.pdf [https://perma.cc/D76Q-R8FA]. 
 52 Council of Conservative Citizens, S. POVERTY LAW CTR., https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-
hate/extremist-files/group/council-conservative-citizens [https://perma.cc/CN7L-6J2R]. 
 53 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896) (“[E]nforced separation of the races, as applied to the internal commerce 
of the State, neither abridges the privileges or immunities of the colored man, deprives him of his property 
without due process of law, nor denies him the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 54 Josh Sanburn, Inside the White Supremacist Group that Influenced Charleston Shooting Suspect, 
TIME (June 22, 2015), http://time.com/3930993/dylann-roof-council-of-conservative-citizens-charleston 
[https://perma.cc/8EPF-DP4S]. 
 55 Rachel Kaadzi Ghansah, A Most American Terrorist: The Making of Dylann Roof, GQ (Aug. 21, 
2017), https://www.gq.com/story/dylann-roof-making-of-an-american-terrorist [https://perma.cc/QZE5-
JCC5]. 
 56 Leti Volpp, The Boston Bombers, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2209, 2209 (2014). 
 57 See Khaled A. Beydoun, Boston Explosions: ‘Please Don’t Be Arabs or Muslims’, AL JAZEERA 
(Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/04/201341681629153634.html 
[https://perma.cc/WN74-B53Q]. 
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“He was reading, always in front of the computer—he was taking classes on 
the Koran.”58 Law enforcement officials argued that Tamerlan was 
instrumental in radicalizing his younger brother, Dzhokhar, while 
“[p]rosecutors claim he was a self-radicalized jihadist who pored over 
militant writings, including an article, ‘How to Build a Bomb in the Kitchen 
of Your Mom.’”59 
Although the brothers may have aspired to be more formally linked to 
an existing terror network, and they posed in front of a black flag “not unlike 
the kind used by extremist groups like al-Qaeda and ISIS,”60 the two lacked 
the social competency, the knowhow, or, most likely, the desire to enlist. 
From the vantage point of law enforcement, they are lone followers of ISIS 
or another terror network. 
5. Lone Wolf Killers 
Outside of the framework of this four-part typology of lone wolf 
terrorists is a fifth and final classification, that of the “lone wolf killer.” This 
is an actor that law enforcement does not investigate as a possible terrorist 
or, after a formal investigation, concludes has no terror ties or motives. The 
terrorist killer may be liable for criminal charges, but is prosecuted beyond 
the parameters of terrorism. 
Many white male mass killers, who account for 62% of mass shootings 
since 1982,61 are designated as lone wolf killers because, in great part, the 
organizations that inspired their violence are not pegged as terrorist groups. 
Alternatively, these killers receive this designation because the racial and 
religious presumption of terror assigned to Muslim culprits is not extended 
to white culprits of the very same or similar acts. 
However, despite this double standard, “a tally kept by the Southern 
Poverty Law Center indicates that the murder of law enforcement officials 
and innocent civilians by race obsessives, anti-government paranoiacs, and 
 
 58 Alissa de Carbonnel & Stephanie Simon, Special Report: The Radicalization of Tamerlan 
Tsarnaev, REUTERS (Apr. 23, 2013, 5:00 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-explosions-
radicalisation-special/special-report-the-radicalization-of-tamerlan-tsarnaev-
idUSBRE93M0CZ20130423 [https://perma.cc/6J9Q-7FFB]. 
 59 Ann O’Neill, The 13th Juror: The Radicalization of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, CNN (Mar. 30, 2015, 
4:17 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2015/03/27/us/tsarnaev-13th-juror-jahar-radicalization/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/VA7X-ZE22]. 
 60 Ashley Collman, Inside the Bedroom of the Boston Bomber: Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Poses with Jihadi 
Black Banner in the Home Where He and His Brother Hatched Terrorist Attack, DAILY MAIL (published 
March 17, 2015; updated March 18, 2015, 5:30 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2998654/Boston-Marathon-bombing-trial-focus-suspects-arrest.html [https://perma.cc/F2KT-5MRC]. 
 61 Mark Follman, Gavin Aronsen & Deanna Pain, US Mass Shootings, 1982–2017: Data from 
Mother Jones’ Investigation, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 2, 2017), 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/12/mass-shootings-mother-jones-full-data [https://perma.cc/
EHE3-LZ39]. 
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other believers in white fringe movements has been depressingly common” 
since the Oklahoma City bombing of April 19, 1995.62 
Although the majority of lone wolf killers are white males, counter-
radicalization—the cornerstone of modern counterterror policing—has 
institutionalized the presumption that lone wolf terrorism is 
disproportionately linked to Muslim culprits. Shifting from the prevailing 
conception of terrorists as foreign agents formally tied to a terror network, 
counter-radicalization conceptualizes Muslim threats as homegrown and 
looming in the form of Muslim citizens and residents who are not soldiers or 
followers of a terror network, but may be inspired by them from afar. 
Consequently, mainstream structural Islamophobic policy facilitates the 
presumption, investigation, and prosecution of Muslim culprits—who may 
be acting in an entirely individual capacity inspired by motives not related to 
terrorism—as lone wolf terrorists. 
II. LONE WOLVES AND RADICALIZATION 
In line with the shifting concern from foreign terrorists to “homegrown 
terrorism,”63 President Barack Obama formally implemented Countering 
Violent Extremism (CVE) in 2011. CVE, the cornerstone of DHS’s counter-
radicalization program, has been referred to as the “signature 
counterterrorism policy of the Obama Administration.”64 Beyond the Obama 
Administration, counter-radicalization remains the crux of President Donald 
Trump’s domestic counterterror strategy, which he is poised to focus entirely 
on “radical Islam.”65 
This Part investigates the theoretical ties that bind radicalization with 
lone wolf terrorism. It also examines the counterterror enforcement that 
presumes that Muslims, and specific expressions of Muslim identity and 
expression, are predictive of terrorism. Section A provides a summary of 
radicalization theory and counter-radicalization policing, while Section B 
examines the potent role whiteness and the “racialization” of Muslim identity 
 
 62 Mathis-Lilley, supra note 36. 
 63 See Sahar Aziz, Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a Post-9/11 
America, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 429, 432 (2012). 
 64 Samuel J. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of Counter-Radicalization, 
64 STAN. L. REV. 125, 127 (2012). 
 65 Julia Edwards Ainsley, Dustin Volz & Kristina Cooke, Exclusive: Trump to Focus Counter-
Extremism Program Solely on Islam, REUTERS (Feb. 1, 2017, 5:17 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-trump-extremists-program-exclusiv/exclusive-trump-to-focus-counter-extremism-
program-solely-on-islam-sources-idUSKBN15G5VO [https://perma.cc/3NTT-SWP3]. 
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plays in shaping and enabling the respective presumptions tied to lone wolf 
terrorism.66 
A. Radicalization and Counter-Radicalization 
1. Radicalization Theory 
Radicalization is built upon the tenet that Muslims living the United 
States may be inspired to adopt a terrorist ideology and take action from a 
catalyst located within the country or beyond its borders. Therefore, lone 
wolves may be moved to attempt or commit violent acts without ever 
enlisting in a terrorist organization or fully adopting its ideology. 
The 9/11 terror attacks spurred the restructuring of the state’s national 
security institutions, most notably the creation of the DHS, and shifted the 
state’s counterterror philosophy “from reactive to proactive, from response 
to prevention.”67 Law scholar Aziz Huq writes, “The authors of 
‘radicalization’ literature attempt to construct a descriptive taxonomy of 
terrorist motivations and interactions to enable prediction of future acts of 
violence. ‘Radicalization’ so defined appears to be a new object of state 
scrutiny and epistemological investment.”68 
Predicting who may develop into a terrorist and preventing them from 
committing the act are the pillars of this new counterterror approach. 
Essentially, “[r]adicalization suggests that the path from Muslim to terrorist 
is a predictable one.”69 This radicalization process is broken up into four 
stages: (1) “preradicalization,” (2) “identification,” (3) “indoctrination,” and 
(4) “action.”70 Therefore, the objective is intervention before a subject 
identifies a terror ideology, is indoctrinated by it (or a terror group), and takes 
material steps toward committing an act of terror. In short, the earlier law 
enforcement acts, the better. 
Radicalization theory was framed to grapple exclusively with Muslim 
threats. Although its baselines, ideas, and arguments are articulated in racial 
and religious terms, radicalization philosophy is driven by four principal 
ends: (1) identifying Islamic ideas or elements that inspire radicalization, (2) 
identifying Muslim radicals or probable radicals, (3) preventing the 
 
 66 “Racial construction” or “racialization” is defined as “an unstable and ‘decentered’ complex of 
social meanings constantly being transformed by political struggle.” MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, 
RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S 55 (1994). For an analysis 
of the legal origins of Muslim racialization in the United States., see Nagwa Ibrahim, The Origins of 
Muslim Racialization in U.S. Law, 7 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 121 (2008). 
 67 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COUNTERTERRORISM SECTION, COUNTERTERRORISM WHITE PAPER 3 
(2006). 
 68 Aziz Z. Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization, 40 DUKE F. L. & SOC. CHANGE 39, 41 (2010). 
 69 Amna Akbar, Policing “Radicalization”, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 809, 811 (2013). 
 70 Id. at 820. 
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radicalization of vulnerable Muslim communities, and (4) preventing acts of 
terrorism. The law enforcement programming that converts radicalization 
theory into robust War on Terror policing, while not patently clear in the 
language of the theory, reveals this fixation on Islam. 
2. Counter-Radicalization Policing 
Ten years after the 9/11 terror attacks, the creation of the DHS,71 and 
enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act,72 Obama implemented a collaborative, 
community-based approach to keep tabs on Muslims in the United States. 
Counter-radicalization policing, dubbed “Countering Violent Extremism” 
(CVE) by DHS,73 would become the new counterterror paradigm and lead 
policing program. 
CVE is built upon a collaborative structure whereby federal 
counterterror agencies, most notably the FBI, work closely and 
collaboratively with local law enforcement departments in communities of 
concern or, more specifically, concentrated Muslim communities. CVE 
seeks to “empower local partners to prevent violent extremists and their 
supporters from inspiring, radicalizing, financing, or recruiting individuals 
or groups in the United States to commit acts of violence”74 and, namely, to 
enlist members of Muslim communities as informants to gather data and 
keep tabs on subjects of interest. These informants may be religious leaders 
and clergy,75 family members, classmates, colleagues, neighbors, 
acquaintances, or anyone who has an established rapport, or can easily build 
one, with a subject of interest. 
By infiltrating Muslim places of worship, community centers, student 
groups, neighborhoods, and households, the most intimate proxies deputized 
as informants engage in surveillance and data collection simultaneously. 
This, in turn, relieves law enforcement agents from these tasks, which are 
often compromised, if not wholly undermined, by the culture of mistrust 
 
 71 DHS was created pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, § 101, 6 U.S.C. § 111 (2012). 
 72 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in 
8 U.S.C. § 1701). 
 73 See generally U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC.,  EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT 
VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES (Aug. 2011), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/empowering_local_partners.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T84E-VW6P] [hereinafter 2011 DHS Counter-Radicalization Program]. 
 74 FBI NAT’L SEC. BRANCH, A New Approach to Countering Violent Extremism: Sharing Expertise 
and Empowering Local Communities, L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. (Oct. 7, 2014), https://leb.fbi.gov/
articles/featured-articles/a-new-approach-to-countering-violent-extremism-sharing-expertise-and-
empowering-local-communities [https://perma.cc/EFM4-N56V]. 
 75 See Dawud Walid, The Danger of Imams Being Involved in CVE, AL MADINA (Sept. 7, 2016), 
http://almadinainstitute.org/blog/the-danger-of-imams-being-involved-in-cve [https://perma.cc/UEF2-
9KXP]. 
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between Muslims and local and federal police during the War on Terror. By 
deputizing Muslims to spy on Muslims, CVE strategy policing brings with it 
the perils of dividing communities, intensifying sectarian tension, and 
carrying forward baseless investigations and prosecutions. 
“[W]hile purportedly aimed at rooting out all violent extremism, [CVE 
programs] have previously focused only on Muslims, stigmatizing them as a 
suspect community.”76 The founding document outlining CVE policing 
explicitly identified Wahhabi-inspired terror networks, with a focus on Al-
Qaeda, as the “challenge.”77 Furthermore, the memo stated that threats were 
“inspired or directed by al-Qai’ida and its affiliates and adherents” in 
addition to neo-Nazis, hate groups, racial supremacists, and “international 
and domestic terrorist groups” generally.78 However, in light of the threat 
posed first by Al-Qaeda and its sympathizers, and then by ISIS,79 of “lur[ing] 
Americans to terrorism in order to create support networks and facilitate 
attack planning” from inside the bounds of American communities— 
particularly those populated by Muslims80—DHS marshaled the bulk of its 
resources and manpower to combat Muslim radicalization. And, as examined 
in Section II.B.2, CVE policing has turned a blind eye to the non-Muslim 
variety of radicalization, particularly that of domestic white terror groups. 
CVE’s fixation on Muslims was again evidenced by the cities DHS 
chose to pilot its policing programs. In 2014, DHS announced that Boston, 
Los Angeles, and Minneapolis would be the first cities to have hardline CVE 
policing programs.81 Contrary to the motives provided to the public for its 
choices,82 DHS locked in on these cities on the grounds of their geographic 
proximity, experience of a recent attack or (perceived) vulnerability to an 
attack and, most of all, Muslim demographics. 
 
 76 Countering Violent Extremism (CVE): A Resource Page, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (published 
Feb. 12, 2015; updated Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/cve-programs-resource-
page [https://perma.cc/G4PB-3DC6]. 
 77 2011 DHS Counter-Radicalization Program, supra note 73, at 1–2. 
 78 Id. at 1. 
 79 For a comprehensive and recent history of ISIS, examining its origins and ideological departure 
and distinctions from Al-Qaeda, the terror organization that preceded it, see FAWAZ GERGES, ISIS: A 
HISTORY (2016). 
 80 2011 DHS Counter-Radicalization Program, supra note 73, at 2. 
 81 See Pilot Programs Are Key to Our Countering Violent Extremist Efforts, DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Feb. 
18, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/pilot-programs-are-key-our-countering-violent-
extremism-efforts [https://perma.cc/4NFA-NCN4] (listing the public motive for selecting these three 
cities). 
 82 See id. 
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Boston may have been chosen as a result of the 2013 Boston Marathon 
bombings, which was committed by the Tsarnaev brothers.83 There was 
growing concern among law enforcement after the bombings that the 
incident might inspire local radicalization and drive subsequent attacks. 
Second, Los Angeles may have been selected as a pilot because of its 
proximity to the Mexican border, believed to be an entryway for terrorists. 
There are also 246 mosques scattered across the state of California, including 
scores in metropolitan Los Angeles.84 Notably, these mosques are situated in 
communities that the Los Angeles Police Department began “mapping” 
seven years before it formally piloted its CVE program in 2014.85 
Finally, Minneapolis and the metropolitan Twin Cities area is home to 
the largest Somali population in the country, largely a recent-immigrant and 
Sunni (Muslim) population with strong ties to their homeland and perceived 
connections to the terror network Al-Shabaab.86 The largest number of CVE-
based prosecutions has involved Somali youth and men from the 
metropolitan Minneapolis area, with ten prosecutions conducted in 2016 
alone.87 
Reflecting CVE’s purchase across political lines, President Trump has 
maintained, and promised to intensify, counter-radicalization against 
Muslim communities in the United States. Furthermore, Trump traded in the 
CVE name used by the Obama Administration for a program that is “likely 
to be renamed Countering Radical Islam or Countering Violent Jihad.”88 
President Trump’s rejiggered counter-radicalization program will be based 
on the very “clash of civilizations” worldview that views Islam as a 
 
 83 Tamerlan and Dzhokar Tsarnaev, Sunni Muslims of Chechen origin, carried out the Boston 
Marathon bombing on April 15, 2013. Tamerlan was killed in the aftermath of the attack, while Dzhokar 
was imprisoned and sentenced to death. See Nina Burleigh, The Brothers Who Became the Boston 
Marathon Bombers, NEWSWEEK (April 6, 2015, 12:02 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/brothers-who-
became-boston-marathon-bombers-319822 [https://perma.cc/M6NV-DHUE]. 
 84 Richard Ostling, U.S. Muslims: Where? How Many?, PATHEOS (May 14, 2013), 
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/religionqanda/2013/05/u-s-muslims-where-how-many 
[https://perma.cc/LY5Z-WXXZ]. 
 85 See Richard Winton, Teresa Watanabe & Greg Krikorian, LAPD Defends Mapping Effort, L.A. 
TIMES (Nov. 10, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-lapd10nov10-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/SET6-FYKY]. 
 86 Khaled A. Beydoun, Between Indigence, Islamophobia and Erasure: Poor and Muslim in “War 
on Terror” America, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1463, 1496 (2016). 
 87 See Julia Edwards, Exclusive: White House Plans Community-Based Prevention of Violent 
Ideologies, REUTERS (Oct. 19, 2016, 6:04 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-justice-
counterterrorism/white-house-plans-community-based-prevention-of-violent-ideologies-
idUSKCN12J15A [https://perma.cc/HA79-49U2]. 
 88 Michael Crowley, Trump’s Terror-Fighting Team Yet to Take Shape, POLITICO (Dec. 20, 2016, 
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monolithic bloc and a sworn rival to the United States.89 As evidenced by his 
rhetoric and policies toward Muslims, this demonization of Islam is, in part, 
driven by an Orientalist blend of racial and religious animus.90 
B. Radicalization and Racialization 
1. Radicalization as a Muslim Phenomenon 
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the beginning of the “War on 
Terror” days later,91 law scholar Natsu Saito marked this critical juncture as 
the moment Muslims were “‘raced’ as ‘terrorists’: foreign, disloyal, and 
imminently threatening.”92 Law scholar Leti Volpp echoed Saito, stating, 
“We are witnessing the redeployment of old Orientalist tropes. Historically, 
Asia and the Middle East have functioned as phantasmic sites on which the 
U.S. nation projects a series of anxieties regarding internal and external 
threats to the coherence of the national body.”93 Thus, individuals from (or 
believed to be from) these regions—even if citizens94—are regularly raced 
as Muslims and, hence, (possible) radicals. 
This racialization of Muslims as terrorists echoes what is commonly 
understood today as Islamophobia, that is, the “presumption that Islam is 
inherently violent, alien and inassimilable [tied to] . . . the belief that 
expressions of Muslim identity are correlative with a propensity for 
terrorism.”95 
However, the racialization of Muslims as terrorists did not arise after 
the 9/11 terror attacks. Rather, the demonization of Islam as a rival 
civilization or race is meticulously critiqued in Edward Said’s magnum opus 
 
 89 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER 
4 (1998). Huntington’s theory, dubbed the “clash of civilizations,” did not narrowly pit the United States 
against “Islamic fundamentalism,” but the entire whole of Islam. Id. 
 90 See Khaled A. Beydoun, “Muslims Bans” and the (Re)Making of Political Islamophobia, 2017 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1733, 1737 (2017) (“Extending the Orientalism framework, Islamophobia is based upon the 
beliefs that Islam is a hostile faith, and that Muslims—even while citizens—are a foreign, violent, and 
unassimilable people.”). 
 91 See Text of George Bush’s Speech, GUARDIAN (Sep. 21, 2001, 11:31 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13 [https://perma.cc/Y7DP-WJPT] 
(quoting President Bush’s declaration that “[o]ur war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end 
there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated”). 
 92 Saito, supra note 17. 
 93 Volpp, supra note 16. 
 94 Immigration law scholar Linda Bosniak writes that Muslim Americans “may now enjoy nominal 
citizenship status, but their members are, in fact, afforded less in the way of substantive citizenship than 
others in society.” LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY 
MEMBERSHIP 30–31 (2008). 
 95 Khaled A. Beydoun, Islamophobia: Toward a Legal Definition and Framework, 116 COLUM. L. 
REV. ONLINE 108, 111 (2016). 
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Orientalism96 and evident during the earliest stages of American political and 
legal history. In fact, from 1790 until 1944, civil courts viewed Islam as 
irreconcilable with American identity, and Muslims were prohibited from 
becoming naturalized citizens.97 This prohibition was rooted in Orientalist 
baselines that cast Muslims as backwards, subversive, violent, and 
threatening to American values and life,98 tropes that form the foundation of 
the modern terrorist stereotype and what Saito and Volpp call the 
racialization of Muslim as terrorists following 9/11. 
The formative racialization of Islam and Muslims, propelled by 
Orientalism, drives the modern racing of Muslims as terrorists during the 
War on Terror. This racialization forms the crux of Islamophobia by 
tethering expressions of Muslim identity to terrorism—initially in the form 
of a foreign, organized threat, and increasingly in the mold of the 
“radicalized” homegrown lone wolf. Therefore, if Muslim identity is 
correlative with a propensity for terrorism, radicalization theory echoes the 
idea that the inchoate process leading up to terrorism can be tied to specific 
expressions of Muslim identity—namely, “radical” or “suspicious 
expressions” that suggest that the radicalization process is imminent or 
already underway. 
2. Of Sheep, Lone Wolves, and Good/Bad Muslims 
The modern War on Terror is built upon pitting Muslims against one 
another as either “sheep” whose religion has been “hijacked,” or as “wolves” 
who carry forward terrorism.99 This binary spawns rivalries among Muslims, 
as evident in CVE policing, and ties specific expressions of religion or 
political speech as “radical” or “moderate.” 
 
 96 See generally EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (1979) (examining how the work of Western scholars, 
artists, and politicians spawned a master discourse whereby the “Occident” (or the West) was defined in 
mirror opposite of the “Orient” (or the Muslim World), which was cast in disparaging terms in relation 
to the glowing terms applied to Europe and, subsequently, the United States). 
 97 Khaled A. Beydoun, Between Muslim and White: The Legal Construction of Arab American 
Identity, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 29, 31–35 (2013). 
 98 See Nagwa Ibrahim, The Origins of Muslim Racialization in U.S. Law, 7 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & 
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Counter-radicalization and the broader War on Terror create a system 
whereby Muslims that perform behavior palatable to the state are tabbed 
unsuspicious, while those that freely exercise their faith and unabashedly 
express their devotion to Islam are vulnerable to surveillance and 
suspicion.100 CVE capitalizes on a binary understanding of Muslims as 
“moderate” or “suspicious,” pitted against one another, to further its strategy. 
“Moderate Muslims” are willing to perform their religious identities in ways 
that align with positive counterterror stereotypes, either conforming or 
concealing Muslim identity traits and behavior in ways that mitigate 
suspicion and underscore patriotism.101 
For instance, a Muslim American woman that dons an American flag 
as a headscarf102 transforms a symbol of perceived subversion or 
subordination into an article signifying allegiance or assimilation. Another 
example is a Muslim that “continually condemn[s] terrorism while avoiding 
discussion of United States foreign policy in the Middle East,”103 
simultaneously heeding calls from the state and mainstream media for more 
“Muslims to denounce terrorism”104 and endorsing the War on Terror abroad 
and domestically. 
On the other hand, “suspicious Muslims” are subjects that exercise their 
faith and express their Muslim identities in ways that raise the presumption 
of radicalization. They are the very subset of people feared to be lone wolves 
in the making. This suspicion of radicalization is often linked to 
constitutionally protected activity—most notably free exercise of religion, 
free speech, or association rights protected by the First Amendment105—and 
to Muslim subjects that engage in “identity-affirming expression of Muslim 
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identity that comports with a Muslim American actor’s religious convictions 
and sense of self.”106 
Therefore, suspicious Muslims are not only those individuals with bona 
fide ties to terrorism but also—according to radicalization theory and 
counter-radicalization policing—any Muslim that engages in religious or 
political expression that raises the FBI’s interest. Political expressions, and 
particularly religiosity, have become a “proxy for terrorism.”107 In turn, there 
now exists a landscape, particularly within concentrated Muslim American 
communities, where large swaths of Muslims could be, and have been, 
investigated as homegrown, lone wolf radicals.108 
3. Counterterror Neglect of White Radicals 
Whereby whiteness generally insulates white culprits of violence, like 
Paddock, from the presumption of terror conspiracy and the reciprocal 
burden of collective guilt, Muslim culprits of violence—and those who have 
not engaged in any affirmative act at all—are bound to this presumption and 
burden, even when the evidence is nonexistent or tenuous. This law 
enforcement presumption that casts white lone wolves as being untied to a 
terror network, or as not motivated by a terror ideology, is rooted in the very 
construction of whiteness itself. 
Even before the independence of the United States as a sovereign 
nation, statesmen began to craft and construct whiteness as the gateway 
toward not only citizenship and the rights and privileges attached to it, but 
also the highest status in society’s (de jure historically, and today, de facto) 
“racial hierarchy.”109 In the seminal article Whiteness as Property, law 
scholar Cheryl Harris writes: 
Whiteness defined the legal status of a person as slave or free. White identity 
conferred tangible and economically valuable benefits and was jealously 
guarded as a valued possession, allowed only to those who met a strict standard 
of proof. Whiteness—the right to white identity as embraced by the law—is 
property if by property one means all of a person’s legal rights.110 
As the racial pinnacle, whiteness extended the full range of rights—and 
the positive presumptions and privileges that emanate from these rights—to 
those who were deemed to be included within it. 
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Non-white groups—Black, Native, Asian, and Muslim (as a racialized 
group)111—were not only denied those rights and what came with them but, 
for much of American history, were enslaved, displaced, decimated, and 
denied entry into the country or its citizenry. As observed by author and 
activist Bryan Stevenson, in addition to the pages of history and the letter of 
the law, “[t]he demographic geography of this nation was shaped by racial 
terrorism,”112 and enabled by the enshrinement of white supremacy, its 
modern residual effects, and its practical incidents. Law scholar Ian Haney 
López states, “Whatever the language used, it is clear that White identity is 
tied inextricably to non-White identity as its positive mirror, its superior 
opposite,”113 a binary that persists today. 
The supreme status and complete corpus of rights extended to Whites 
also extended a range of positive tropes and presumptions. In popular 
culture, most notably cinema, “whiteness is often associated with innocence 
and goodness,”114 and these tropes trickle down into the law and its 
enforcement. Furthermore, if the law has long cast whiteness and classed 
whites as the very embodiment of good citizens and archetypal Americans, 
then the presumptions attached to the foundational caricatures will likewise 
be positive—in the popular imagination and, indeed, through law 
enforcement. 
Whiteness extends the presumption of innocence not only to the entire 
collective, but also to the individual—even after she has committed a 
criminal or violent act. Meanwhile, Blackness infers the presumption of 
criminal deviance onto an individual because of the negative trope applied 
to the entire group, and Muslim identity creates the presumption of terrorism 
onto an individual because of the stereotype assigned to the entire group. 
The distinct racialization of Whites and non-Whites, and how it informs 
the modern framing of terrorism, is vividly illustrated by the underpolicing 
of white hate and terrorist groups. In a 2015 study, titled Terror From the 
Right, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) detailed the list of mass 
shootings, violent acts, and terrorism by white, non-Muslim culprits since 
Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, two white men, conspired to bomb the 
Alfred Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City and killed 168 people.115 
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With one hundred plots outlined in the study, the SPLC highlights that the 
vast majority of foiled and completed violent attacks in the United States in 
the two decades after the Oklahoma City bombing were committed by some 
strand of white male terrorism.116 
Despite murders driven by neo-Nazi National Alliance members,117 a 
foiled Ku Klux Klan “plot to blow up a natural gas refinery . . . [where 
authorities claimed] as many a 30,000 might have died,”118 and the arrest of 
two white supremacists for “plotting to assassinate Barack Obama and 
murder more than 100 black people” in 2008,119 no CVE programs have been 
piloted or implemented in neo-Nazi, KKK, or white supremacist strongholds 
despite their heavy presence across the country.120 Further, there has been 
little manpower and attention marshaled to fighting this brand of terrorism, 
as the groups are oftentimes not even viewed by law enforcement as bona 
fide terrorist organizations, but rather as hate groups. 
Despite the documented uptick in white male terrorism, the 
counterterror apparatuses of the state have instead marshaled the vast bulk 
of their energy and resources to deter and defeat Islamic terrorism. 
Moreover, the War on Terror has shifted its focus to combating homegrown 
radicalization solely of the Muslim variety, not the types of organizational 
and lone wolf incidents unleashed by white culprits. 
III. POLICING LONE WOLF TERRORISM 
Although lone wolf terrorism is fueled by a range of ideologies and 
carried out in a myriad of ways, investigation and prosecution of it by law 
enforcement generally fixates on (nominal or bona fide) Muslim actors. This 
is, in large part, driven by embedded and institutionalized stereotypes that tie 
Muslim identity to terrorism and, most potently, the prevailing counterterror 
priorities of the War on Terror.121 
Race and religion, as illustrated in Section II.B, become the principal 
loci whereby the lone wolf designation is extended as a presumptive 




 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 5. 
 118 Id. at 9. 
 119 Id. at 32. 
 120 Id. at 45 (providing a map and distribution of where the KKK, neo-Nazi, white nationalist, racist 
skinhead, Christian Identity, and neo-Confederate groups are located). 
 121 See Beydoun, supra note 95, at 111 (defining Islamophobia as “the presumption that Islam is 
inherently violent, alien, and inassimilable . . . [which drives] the belief that expressions of Muslim 
identity are correlative with a propensity for terrorism”). 
112:1213 (2018) Lone Wolf Terrorism  
1237 
connection to terrorism when the culprit is Muslim. This is most evident in 
the immediate aftermath of mass killings, including the Las Vegas and 
Orlando shootings, whereby Paddock was swiftly presumed to be a lone wolf 
killer, while Mateen was immediately suspected of being a lone wolf 
terrorist. For Paddock, the lone wolf designation was applied as a 
presumptive exemption from terrorism, while it was assigned as a 
presumptive connection to terrorism in the case of Mateen. Section A 
examines the former, while Section B investigates the latter. 
A. Lone Wolf as a Terrorism Exemption 
Within the popular discourse, the lone wolf tag is generally understood 
as an exception assigned to white culprits of violence to disconnect them 
from culpability of terrorism.122 In this vein, the “lone wolf” designation is 
regarded as one of many “excuses” afforded to white culprits to sustain their 
individuality, and it propagates the narrative that terrorism is largely a 
Muslim phenomenon. Although in line with the lone wolf typology outlined 
in Section II.B, this is technically not true; the framing of radicalization as a 
Muslim phenomenon has aligned the discursive understanding of lone wolf 
to be virtually congruent with terror investigation and prosecution realities. 
Because Muslim identity alone raises the presumption of radicalization, the 
racial identity of a white (non-Muslim) culprit tends to diminish the 
possibility, and, in turn, the investigation, into terrorism. 
This is most manifest in cases where evidence of a terrorist connection 
is absent or tenuous, such as those of Paddock and Mateen. While the FBI 
carried forward an extensive investigation into Mateen’s case, the formal 
inquiry into Paddock’s possible organizational or ideological ties with 
terrorism were stunted hours after his dead body was found on the thirty-
second floor of the Mandalay Bay Hotel on October 1, 2017. 
Several hours after the incident, Clark County Sherriff Joseph 
Lombardo identified Paddock as a “lone wolf.”123 Here, Lombardo’s 
classification of Paddock aligned with the popular definition of “lone 
wolf,”124 exempting Paddock from connections to any terror organization or 
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ideology.125 A day after the incident, Aaron Rouse, FBI Las Vegas Special 
Agent in Charge, echoed Lombardo, stating that Paddock “to this point, [had] 
no connection with an international terrorist group.”126 
It is likely that Paddock’s motive was not tied to a specific terrorist 
ideology or inspired by a hate or terror group. But, the statements made by 
Lombardo and Rouse in the immediate aftermath of the attack illustrated the 
force of the presumptive exemption from terrorism applied to white culprits. 
To investigate this presumption more closely, Lombardo’s use of “local” was 
used to negate the possibility of terror involvement.127 Although Muslims 
suspected of radicalization are dubbed “homegrown,” a synonymous term, 
the designation of “local” is not extended to Muslim suspects or culprits of 
violence.128 
A day following the Las Vegas shooting, I made that very observation 
in the Washington Post: 
But why is one person “homegrown” while someone else [Paddock] is a “lone” 
or “local wolf”? An extensive list of exemptions has become available to white 
culprits of mass violence, most notably “lone wolf” or “insane,” and the Las 
Vegas shooting adds the status of being a “local individual” to the roster. 
Certainly, many of the Muslim Americans pursued as prospective radicals in 
Minneapolis, Boston, Los Angeles or Washington, D.C.—cities where counter-
radicalization programs are robustly enforced—are tied to specific 
communities. They, too, are local.129 
However, the practical effect of being a “local” person invites suspicion 
and possible surveillance for Muslim actors. If Paddock were Muslim, his 
status as a local would be emblematic of imminent threat, and “the motive 
of ‘Islamic terrorism’ or ‘jihad’ would likely be immediately assumed, even 
without any evidence.”130 
As counter-radicalization theory outlines, and CVE policing enforces, 
all Muslim radicals are homegrown and, hence, local. For Muslims, 
however, being a local is not an exemption from, but rather a connector to, 
homegrown radicalization and terrorism. 
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B. Lone Wolf as a Terrorism Connection 
1. Lone Wolf Terrorists 
Muslim culprits of violence are routinely presumed to be, and 
subsequently investigated as, lone wolf terrorists. Again, a lone wolf terrorist 
is a culprit carrying out an ideologically-motivated attack in an individual 
capacity who falls within one of the four types outlined in Section I.B: (1) 
lone soldiers, (2) lone vanguards, (3) loners, or (4) lone followers. 
Hours after Mateen killed forty-nine people inside Pulse Nightclub, the 
FBI and President Obama pegged his actions as “homegrown extremism,”131 
effectively concluding that he was a lone wolf terrorist before conducting an 
official investigation.132 FBI officials, who were the first people to call the 
massacre an “act of terror,” did not issue particulars about Mateen’s 
motive.133 However, his intentions were seemingly apparent on account of 
Mateen’s ethnic heritage and, most potently, his religious identity as a 
Muslim. 
In fact, the immediate conclusion that Mateen was a lone wolf terrorist 
conflicted with three FBI interviews that cleared Mateen of any involvement 
or affiliation with terror groups. These interviews were all held in 2014 and 
2013—one and two years, respectively, before the Orlando shooting—and 
were closed when FBI agents were “unable to verify any suspicious ties.”134 
Although Mateen exhibited symptoms of volatility and reports alleged that 
he may have been a “closet homosexual,”135 which his ex-wife confirmed,136 
numerous FBI interviews and investigations cleared him of any connections 
to terrorism. 
Yet, despite being cleared of terrorism on two separate occasions, FBI 
brass and President Obama still characterized Mateen’s violent shooting as 
a terror attack and labeled his actions as homegrown extremism the day 
after.137 This illustrates the force of the presumptive connection to terrorism 
when the actor is Muslim, particularly when the evidence establishing a 
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motive—in the form of being inspired by a specific ideology or a nexus to a 
terror group—is meager. 
The FBI investigated Mateen in the way they routinely investigate 
Muslim culprits: in reverse. They designated him a lone wolf terrorist with 
alleged ties to ISIS based on Internet activity138 and a pledge he made for the 
first time by phone before taking his life.139 But the facts around this 
connection were vague and, moreover, it was isolated from any contextual 
or corroborating evidence that established, or even implicated, a material 
connection to the terror network. In fact, “ISIS also made it clear that the 
shooting had not been commissioned by senior commanders in the Middle 
East, as was the case in with the Paris attacks in November.”140 However, the 
FBI persisted, seeking to draw a connection with ISIS that established the 
theory that he was in fact an “Islamic State fighter.”141 
Again, three FBI interviews before Mateen fired shots in Pulse 
Nightclub found otherwise.142 Nothing in the years between those interviews 
and the shooting suggested that Mateen enlisted in ISIS or informally 
developed relationships with ISIS leadership or rank-and-file members. 
However, the FBI continued a thorough and prolonged investigation seeking 
to deliver on the hasty conclusion they rendered on the morning after the 
Orlando shooting, reaching far for any piece of evidence that could justify a 
theory that Mateen was a loner143 or lone follower144 lone wolf. 
However, as the investigation dragged on and failed to unearth evidence 
that Mateen was a loner or follower tied to ISIS, it became patently clear that 
the conclusion made by the FBI and President Obama was driven, almost 
entirely, by the racial and religious identity of Mateen. His identity as Afghan 
and Muslim stood as the only evidence of terrorism, which, in turn, revealed 
the force of the presumptive connection to (lone wolf) terrorism assigned to 
Muslim culprits during the War on Terror. Further highlighting the 
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dubiousness of his terror ties, the FBI indicated that “[w]hen Mateen said he 
was a member of Hezbollah, a Shiite group, and had family ties to Al Qaeda, 
a Sunni group, it was clear he didn’t know or care they were bitter [sectarian] 
rivals.”145 
The force of the immediate presumption of terrorism tied to Muslim 
lone wolves is vividly evident in Mateen’s case. Despite the scant evidence, 
law enforcement still persisted in its attempts to uncover terror ties that 
investigation after investigation failed to reveal. “If terrorism is defined as 
ideological violence . . . should an attacker who has merely ranted about 
religion, politics or race be considered a terrorist?”146 wrote Scott Shane of 
the New York Times, arguing that the threshold for an ideological motive is 
far higher than a scattered set of statements that may be elevated and 
embellished to deliver the conclusion rendered well before an investigation 
commenced, as in the case of a Muslim lone wolf like Mateen. 
2. Lone Wolf Radicals 
Muslims that commit no crime, let alone an act of violence, are 
routinely presumed to be lone wolf radicals. Lone wolf radicals have not 
committed an act of violence and oftentimes have not exhibited a material 
threat of violence, and thus are not yet terrorists, but are believed to “hold 
extremist or radicalized views” that foreshadow terrorism.147 
Thus, as outlined in Section II.A, radicalization theory drives the double 
standards associated with lone wolf terrorism in an additional, more 
damaging, regard. By holding specific expressions of Muslim identity as 
predictive of radicalization, Muslim subjects are presumptively guilty based 
on their mere free exercise of religion and other core First Amendment 
rights, even when no criminal or violent acts have been undertaken by the 
subject.148 
In short, the possibility of (terror) guilt looms with Muslims just 
because they are Muslim, juxtaposed with the reality that white, non-Muslim 
culprits of violence—like Paddock—are seldom guilty of terrorism even 
after they commit an act of violence. This absurd state of affairs indicates 
that the predictive logic of counter-radicalization is, in essence, a new brand 
 
 145 Wilber, supra note 138. 
 146 Scott Shane, Homegrown Extremists Tied to Deadlier Toll Than Jihadists in U.S. Since 9/11, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/25/us/tally-of-attacks-in-us-challenges-
perceptions-of-top-terror-threat.html [https://perma.cc/EQ65-UFAK]. 
 147 CONNOR & FLYNN, supra note 23, at 9. 
 148 See Akbar, supra note 69, at 868–81. As a result, “[Muslims] cannot [be] guarantee[d] 
confidential space in their mosques or cannot be sure who is an informant, and Muslim student groups 
have banned political discussions from their campus offices. Muslims feel the stigma in their bodies, and 
in their ability to move and speak in the world.” Id. at 870. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1242 
of religious and racial profiling which, like its predecessors, taps whiteness 
as the ultimate exemption from terror suspicion and holds Muslim identity 
as the very essence, and evidence, of terror suspicion. 
CONCLUSION 
The tales of Paddock and Mateen, lone wolves that unleashed two of 
the greatest mass killings in modern American history, are more similar than 
distinct. The force of the facts reveals that both men were troubled and 
volatile; one loved country music while the other “loved Afghan music.”149 
Ultimately, both possessed characters riddled with contradiction, driven to 
commit violence of a horrific scale. 
Depending on the denotation used, both very well could be branded 
terrorists, or otherwise. Yet, their racial and religious identities—Paddock a 
white male, and Mateen an Afghan Muslim—relegate the importance of the 
definition of terrorism in favor of law enforcement’s fixation on racial and 
religious identity, which is evidently in the driver’s seat when the lone wolf 
designation is assigned as a presumptive exemption or connection to 
terrorism. 
The lone wolf terrorism double standards this Essay highlights not only 
affect individual actors, but also have a spillover impact on Muslim 
Americans that exposes them to private backlash and state surveillance. 
Essentially, “[t]he burden of collateral and collective guilt has become a 
central component of the modern Muslim American experience,”150 while the 
broader white population is never tied to the misdeeds and violence of 
culprits like Paddock, Roof, Kaczynsky. 
This collateral and collective guilt is vividly highlighted in the War on 
Terror, most strikingly after a terror attack. “Days after the terrorist attack 
by Syed Farook and Tashfeen Malik in San Bernardino, California, for 
example, Donald Trump, then still a presidential candidate, called for ‘a 
complete and total shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.’”151 
Since proposing the “Muslim Ban” on the campaign trail, President Trump 
has passed three renditions of the travel ban, most recently an order calling 
for “enhanced vetting” on September 24, 2017.152 
Yet, the institutional response to assign collective guilt to all Muslim 
Americans precedes Trump and supersedes political lines. President Barack 
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Obama visited a Baltimore mosque on February 3, 2016—his first visit to a 
U.S. mosque since becoming President in 2008—to ratchet up support for 
CVE policing.153 Therefore, the racial and religious conflation of terrorism 
with Muslim identity that enables the immediate presumption that any and 
every Muslim lone wolf is a terrorist does not only affect the individual 
culprit, but also stigmatizes Muslim Americans as an entire class and opens 
the floodgates for private backlash and enhanced state surveillance. 
Muslim lone wolves, from the vantage point of the state, rise from a 
flock of rabid and radical wolves, while others, like Stephen Paddock, act 
entirely alone and apart from the flock they resemble. 
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